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abstract 
In Japan, the newspapers with the greatest daily circulation offer both 
morning and evening editions in most of their distribution areas. Their 
prices per page of actual content are different for morning-and-evening 
subscribers than for morning-only subscribers.  So the subscription price 
schedules could be described as sliding scales.  These are tariff schedules 
that are step functions, and thus nonlinear.  My focus is on two aspects of 
nonlinear pricing by Japanese newspapers.  The first is that pricing and 
circulation of the differing editions reveal parameters of the demand for 
newspaper content.  I estimate these parameters using nonlinear least 
squares and find that price elasticity of demand is around 1.2, while 
elasticity of demand with respect to pages of content is around 0.5. 
Estimates from micro-data have price elasticity around 1.3 and elasticity 
with respect to pages of content around 0.4. The second aspect of nonlinear 
pricing on which I focus is the distorting effect of demanders’ incentive 
compatibility constraints on the newspaper publishers’ choice of newspaper 
content.  The newspaper publishers wastefully reduce the number of pages 
of content of their morning editions to deter morning-and-evening 
subscribers from cancelling their evening subscriptions. It is wasteful in the 
sense that the marginal value to subscribers of an additional page of content 
in the morning edition is less than the marginal cost. 
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Nonlinear Pricing of Japanese Newspapers  
 
1. Introduction 
In Japan, the newspapers with the greatest daily circulation offer both morning and 
evening editions in most of their distribution areas.  The national dailies (Yomiuri, Asahi, 
Mainichi, and Sankei) all do so and the bloc newspapers (Chunichi, Chogoku and Hokkaido) 
do as well.  Typically, these offer subscribers a choice between subscribing to the morning 
edition only, or subscribing to both morning and evening edition.  In some locales away 
from urban centers, the national newspapers are only offered as morning editions.  And a 
number of regional newspapers with smaller circulation (To-o Nippo, Oita Godo, Iwate 
Nippo, Yamagata Shimbun, Ryukyu Shimpo) offer both morning and evening editions 
together, but with no option of subscribing to the morning edition only. Shizuoka Shimbun 
purports to offer subscribers a choice between morning and evening editions or just evening 
edition, but almost none opt for just the evening edition. 
Consider the subscription pricing of the newspapers offered either as morning edition 
or morning plus evening edition.  The modal prices (set by Yomiuri, Asahi, and Mainichi) 
since 2003 are 3,007 yen per month for the morning-only and 3,925 yen per month for 
morning-and-evening.  Though seldom remarked, this is an example of nonlinear pricing in 
the sense that the price per page of actual content, that is price divided by printed pages 
exclusive of advertising, is different for morning-and-evening subscribers than for 
morning-only subscribers.  So the subscription price schedules could be described as sliding 
scales.  These are tariff schedules that are step functions, and thus nonlinear.  Other 
examples of such pricing abound.  Transport fares offered in differing quality classes, 
beverage prices that differ per unit depending on the size of container, prices of electricity 
that vary depending on monthly number of kilowatts used, and so on, are obvious examples. 
     My focus is on two aspects of nonlinear pricing by Japanese newspapers.  The first is 
that pricing and circulation of the differing editions reveal parameters of the demand for 
newspaper content.  I estimate these parameters using nonlinear least squares and find that 
price elasticity of demand lies around 1.2, while elasticity of demand with respect to pages of 
content is around 0.5.  Producing these estimates solves a difficult problem in that almost all 
of the newspapers set exactly the same prices as one another. With virtually no cross-section 
(or temporal) variation in prices it is still possible to infer price elasticity of demand based on 
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an assumed relationship between individuals’ valuations of pages of content and their 
valuations of subscriptions.   
     The second aspect of nonlinear pricing on which I focus is the distorting effect of 
demanders’ incentive compatibility constraints on the newspaper publishers’ choice of 
newspaper content.  The newspaper publishers wastefully reduce the number of pages of 
content of their morning editions to deter morning-and-evening subscribers from cancelling 
their evening subscriptions. I estimate the value of this waste at around six yen per month per 
morning-only subscriber.  All of this requires a general framework for thinking about 
newspaper pricing that takes into account that newspapers are platforms in two-sided markets.  
They sell both subscriptions and advertising, and the demand for advertising depends on the 
number of subscribers.  
     This paper contributes to the empirical literature on second-degree price discrimination. 
It also contributes to the econometric analysis of platforms in two-sided markets, newspapers 
in particular.  Empirical studies of second-degree price discrimination, that is price 
discrimination relying on self-selection of demanders when presented with a nonlinear 
pricing schedule, include Cohen (2001) for paper towels, Busse and Rysman (2005) for 
yellow pages advertising, McManus (2007) for coffee drinks, and Shum and Crawford (2007) 
for cable television subscriptions.  Econometric analysis of newspaper pricing include Van 
Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) for Italy, Cayseele and Vanormelingen (2009) for Belgium, 
and Fan (2011) for the United States. 
A novel contribution here is an original partial-equilibrium model of the demand for 
subscriptions to morning edition and morning-and-evening edition of a newspaper that 
enables estimates of the effect of incentive-compatibility constraint on pages of content in the 
morning edition.  I find that the Japanese newspapers that offer a choice between 
morning-only subscription and morning-and-evening subscription reduce the number of 
pages of content in the morning edition by about six percent, to deter morning-and-evening 
subscribers from switching to morning-only.  A further novel contribution is use of the same 
model as a new way of estimating elasticity of demand for newspapers with respect to 
subscription price and pages of content, using very limited data. 
 
2.  Basic Framework. 
     I begin by describing the pricing and content choices of a single-edition newspaper, for 
example one that is offered in morning edition only.  Let us suppose that the demand for ads 
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“a” depends on the price to place an ad per subscriber “pa/s” and that the readers regard the 
ads indifferently.  Here an ad is defined as a printed item supplied to all subscribers, the 
same as the subscription content k. The only difference is that the ad is paid for by the 
advertiser but the other content is paid for by the subscribers.  To keep matters simple, posit 
a constant elasticity demand system facing the newspaper:  
[1]     𝑠 = 𝐴𝑝𝑠−𝜉𝑠  𝑘𝜃  
[2]  𝑎 = 𝐵 �𝑝𝑎
𝑠
�
−𝜉𝑎
  
where ξs >1, ξa >1, and 0<θ<1.    
     Let the cost of newspaper production depend on number of ads and circulation and on 
amount of content.  These costs include first-copy costs faa+fkk, and costs that depend on 
number of copies 𝑐0𝑠 + 𝑐̅𝑎𝑠 + 𝑐̅𝑘𝑠: 
[3]   𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 = 𝑓𝑎𝑎 + 𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝑐0𝑠 + 𝑐̅𝑎𝑠 + 𝑐̅𝑘𝑠  
Here, c0 is the unit cost of distribution net of advertisers’ payments to distributors for 
including inserts (substantial in Japan, almost as large as advertisers’ payments to newspapers 
for print ads).  𝑐̅ is the cost per page of actually printing the newspaper (where k and a are 
the numbers of pages of content and of ads), fk is the first-copy cost of producing a page of 
content and fa is the first-copy cost of producing a page of advertising.  Notice that because 
of the term 𝑐̅𝑎𝑠 in the cost function, the costs are not separable into cost of subscription and 
cost of advertising.  This makes it problematic to speak separately of the profits from 
subscriptions and from advertising. 
     The incremental costs cs , ca , and ck of supplying subscriptions, ads and content are the 
following:  
[4]  𝑐𝑠 = 𝜕𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝜕𝑠 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐̅𝑎 + 𝑐̅𝑘  
[5]  𝑐𝑎 = 𝜕𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝜕𝑎 = 𝑓𝑎 + 𝑐̅𝑠  
[6]  𝑐𝑘 = 𝜕𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝜕𝑘 = 𝑓𝑘 + 𝑐̅𝑠  
The newspaper chooses content, price of ads, and price of subscriptions to maximize total 
profit: 
[7]            max𝑝𝑠,𝑝𝑎,𝑘 𝜋 = 𝑝𝑠𝑠 + 𝑝𝑎𝑎 − 𝑓𝑎𝑎 − 𝑐̅𝑎𝑠 − 𝑓𝑘𝑘 − 𝑐̅𝑘𝑠 − 𝑐0𝑠  
The necessary conditions for maximum profit reduce to the following pricing rules2: 
                                                          
2The price-cost margin for subscriptions exemplifies the behavior of a multi-product monopolist 
supplying two goods that are complements in demand.  In general, where the demands are as follows 
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[8]  𝑝𝑎−𝑐𝑎
𝑝𝑎
= 1
𝜉𝑎
  
[9]  𝑝𝑠−𝑐𝑠
𝑝𝑠
= 1
𝜉𝑠
−
𝑝𝑎𝑎
𝑝𝑠𝑠
  
Profit-maximizing also requires that content k, the number of pages not including ads, fulfills 
the condition:  
[10]  𝑐𝑘𝑘
𝑝𝑠𝑠
= 𝜃
𝜉𝑠
  
This expression resembles the Dorfman-Steiner condition describing optimal advertising 
expenditure.  This is because, analytically, the model here is the same as the 
Dorfman-Steiner advertising model: Demand for subscriptions has constant elasticity (0 < θ 
<1) with respect to content, just as in the Dorfman-Steiner model demand for the product has 
constant elasticity with respect to quantity of ads.  
     Rearranging in a useful way, the pricing and content rules are: 
[11]  𝑝𝑎 = (𝑓𝑎 + 𝑐̅𝑠) �1 − 1𝜉𝑎�−1  
[12]  𝑝𝑠 = �𝑐0 + 𝑐̅𝑎 + 𝑐̅𝑘 − 𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑠 � �1 − 1𝜉𝑠�−1  
[13]  𝑘 = 𝜃𝑝𝑠𝑠
𝜉𝑠(𝑓𝑘+𝑐̅𝑠)  
The subscription price ps is set as though the newspaper were receiving a subsidy per 
subscriber equal to the marginal profit that arises indirectly from advertising with each copy 
sold (for given price of advertising pa):  
[14]  𝜕(𝑝𝑎𝑎−𝑓𝑎𝑎−𝑐̅𝑎𝑠)
𝜕𝑎
𝜕𝑎
𝜕𝑠
+ 𝜕(𝑝𝑎𝑎−𝑓𝑎𝑎−𝑐̅𝑎𝑠)
𝜕𝑠
= (𝑝𝑎 − 𝑓𝑎 − 𝑐̅𝑠) 𝜕𝑎𝜕𝑠 − 𝑐̅𝑎                                                                  = (𝑝𝑎 − 𝑓𝑎 − 𝑐̅𝑠) 𝑝𝑎𝜉𝑎𝑠 − 𝑐̅𝑎                                                                  = 𝑝𝑎𝑎
𝑠
− 𝑐̅𝑎  
This marginal profit equals the marginal revenue that arises indirectly from advertising 
(=paa/s), minus the added-cost-per-copy attributable to advertising (=𝑐̅𝑎). 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Q1= A p1-ξ1 p2ξ12 
Q2= B p2-ξ2 p1ξ21, 
and marginal costs are c1 and c2, the profit-maximizing pricing rules are: 
(p1-c1)/p1   =    1/ξ1   +   ((p2-c2)/p2) (ξ21/ξ1) (p2Q2 / p1Q1)                   
(p2-c2)/p2   =    1/ξ2   +   ((p1-c1)/p1) (ξ12/ξ2) (p1Q1 / p2Q2) . 
See for example Tirole (1988, pp.69-71).  But here the cross-elasticities of demand are:   
ξ12=∂ln a / ∂ln ps = −ξaξs(=ξ1ξ2), and  
ξ21=∂ln s/ ∂ln pa = 0.  
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3. Subscription to morning-edition-only versus morning-and-evening edition. 
     Many of the large circulation daily newspapers in Japan have both morning and 
evening editions.  Most of these offer their customers a choice between subscribing to the 
morning edition only, or subscribing to both editions.  The evening editions of these papers 
generally have about one third as many pages of content as the morning editions and about 
one fifth the number of pages of ads.  For detailed data on the subscription prices, pages of 
content and pages of ads of morning and evening editions of selected Japanese newspapers in 
2007, refer to Table 1.  The newspapers in this table include the various regional editions of 
the four national dailies, include the regional “bloc” dailies, and include the local 
(one-prefecture) newspapers that offer their subscribers a choice between morning-only and 
morning-and-evening and that have circulation greater than 100,000 for each.  I exclude the 
Nikkei Shimbun which is a business newspaper similar to the Wall Street Journal, not really a 
general news daily like the newspapers in the sample. 
     A useful way of thinking about the pricing and content of morning and evening 
editions is with reference to the economics of nonlinear pricing.  The nonlinearity inheres in 
the fact that the price per page of content is different for combined morning and evening 
subscriptions than for just morning editions.  This suggests some useful lines of inquiry.  
For instance, do newspaper publishers reduce the number of content pages of their morning 
editions to discourage dual subscribers from cancelling their evening subscriptions, in the 
same way that airlines reduce the quality of economy seating to discourage first-class 
passengers from switching to economy? This is a phenomenon noted by the nineteenth 
century French economist Jules Dupuit (1804-1866) with respect to train fares.  The Dupuit 
phenomenon is an example of monopoly waste in the sense that quality of the lower priced 
version of the product is reduced below the economically efficient level to conform with the 
incentive compatibility constraint of the higher valuing customers.  This waste has been 
empirically verified and estimated by McManus (2007) for coffee drink pricing.  Shum and 
Crawford (2007) infer similar wasteful degradation in the quality of cable TV offerings.   
     Another line of inquiry is whether comparisons of the demand for morning editions and 
for combined morning and evening editions reveal underlying parameters related to the 
elasticity of demand for newspapers with respect to prices and to pages of content.  Within 
the simple framework set out above, I would suggest that these parameters are so revealed.  
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This requires developing the micro-foundations of the constant-elasticity demand system.   
     Posit a population of households s=1,..,n, each of which has marginal valuation of 
newspaper content per page (that is printed pages k not including advertising), for a particular 
newspaper, as follows: 
[15]  𝑣′ = 𝜃
𝜉𝑠
𝐴
1
𝜉𝑠 𝑠− 1𝜉𝑠  𝑘−𝜉𝑠−𝜃𝜉𝑠   
where 0 < θ < 1, and ξs >1.  This means that for each household, marginal value per page of 
content becomes less as the number of pages increases, but this relationship is inelastic 
[16]  𝜕 ln𝑣
′
𝜕 ln𝑘
= −�𝜉𝑠−𝜃
𝜉𝑠
�  < 0  
            > −1  
It also means that the index s numbers households in rank order from the highest marginal 
valuer (s=1) to the least (s=s>>>) :   
[17]  𝜕 ln𝑣
′
𝜕 ln 𝑠
= − 1
𝜉𝑠
< 0  
The value to household s of a newspaper with km pages of content is 
 
[18]  𝑣(𝑠) = ∫ 𝑣′(𝑘)𝑑𝑘𝑘𝑚0             = ∫ 𝜃
𝜉𝑠
𝐴
1
𝜉𝑠 𝑠− 1𝜉𝑠 𝑘−𝜉𝑠−𝜃𝜉𝑠 𝑑𝑘𝑘𝑚
0
            = 𝐴 1𝜉𝑠  𝑠− 1𝜉𝑠 𝑘𝑘 𝜃𝜉𝑠  
 
And the demand for a newspaper with km pages of content is the number of households for 
which the value of the paper is greater than or equal to the price pm (of the morning edition, 
say).  Because the index s numbers households in rank order from the highest valuer to the 
lowest, the number of households for which the value of the newspaper is greater than or 
equal to its price equals the index identifying the household for which the value just equals 
price.  That is the demand for morning edition with km pages of content is 
[19]  𝑠𝑘 = 𝐴𝑝𝑘−𝜉𝑠  𝑘𝑘𝜃  
Now suppose that rather than just the one newspaper, there are several newspapers, not 
just a monopoly but an oligopoly.  If there are several different newspapers from which 
demanders can choose, then 𝑣′(𝑠), the marginal value of content pages in the one newspaper 
by individual s, should be understood to mean the individual’s marginal value of content 
pages in the one newspaper relative to his next highest valued alternative.  And as the one 
newspaper comes to have more content, the alternative that is the individual’s next highest 
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valued may become a different one than before. The population of demanders and their 
marginal valuations of content in the one newspaper thus depend upon: (1) the choice set for 
each demander, in other words which newspapers are available in the place where the 
demander resides, (2) the number of pages of content of each alternative newspaper, and (3) 
the subscription price of each alternative newspaper.  The current framework represents the 
demand for the one newspaper, while holding as fixed all these various details of the prices 
and content of rival newspapers. Stole (2007, Section 6.2) discusses the deeper foundation for 
such a demand function, in cases where the products of competing firms are horizontally 
differentiated and where vertically differentiated.  A superficial treatment of these 
foundations is adequate for the partial equilibrium analysis I conduct here. 
Next suppose that, again given the prices and contents of rival newspapers, subscribers 
to the morning edition of the one newspaper may also subscribe to an evening edition of the 
same newspaper. Denote the numbers of pages of content in the two editions km and ke .  By 
similar reasoning to the above, the value of the evening edition to a subscriber of the morning 
edition is 
[20]  𝑣𝑒(𝑠) = ∫ 𝑣′(𝑘)𝑑𝑘𝑘𝑚+𝑘𝑒𝑘𝑚             = 𝐴 1𝜉𝑠  𝑠− 1𝜉𝑠  �(𝑘𝑘 + 𝑘𝑒) 𝜃𝜉𝑠 − 𝑘𝑘 𝜃𝜉𝑠�  
 
Denote by pe the price of the evening edition (so a joint subscription including both morning 
and evening editions is priced  pm+pe).  The demand for the evening edition (that is, se such 
that ve(se)=pe ) is 
[21]  𝑠𝑒 = 𝐴𝑝𝑒−𝜉𝑠  �(𝑘𝑘 + 𝑘𝑒) 𝜃𝜉𝑠 − 𝑘𝑘 𝜃𝜉𝑠�𝜉𝑠  
Now  
[22]  𝑠𝑒
𝑠𝑚
= �𝑝𝑚
𝑝𝑒
�
𝜉𝑠
��
𝑘𝑚
𝑘𝑚+𝑘𝑒
�
−
𝜃
𝜉𝑠 − 1�𝜉𝑠  
 
I estimate the parameters ξs and θ in this equation [22] using nonlinear least squares.  
The data for the estimate are, first, that shown in Table 1, for which the unit of observation is 
the nation (aggregate data). The number of observations equal to 23 is simply the number of 
newspapers in the sample. The results of estimation using this dataset are in the left-hand 
column of Table 2.   It seems that price elasticity of demand ξs is near 1.2, while elasticity 
of demand with respect to pages of content is around 0.5, values that seem plausible.  But 
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the standard errors are very large.  In an attempt to estimate the parameters more precisely I 
compiled a second dataset, including the same newspapers but for which the unit of 
observation for circulation is the city, town or village rather than the nation. I exclude any 
observations with only morning subscribers or only morning-and-evening subscribers.  The 
source of the circulation data is the Japan Audit Bureau of Circulation (from their website, 
behind a paywall).  Using this disaggregated data there are actually enough observations to 
estimate separate equations for Yomiuri and for Asahi which are shown in the table.  The 
estimates for Yomiuri have price elasticity near 1.2 and elasticity with respect to pages of 
content of 0.4, with standard errors much smaller than for the small sample.  
Other results are less satisfactory. The estimate for Asahi has elasticity of demand 
implausibly less than one at 0.9.  The full sample including all of the newspapers in the 
aggregate dataset also has this same disappointing result (price elasticity less than one).  
Elasticity with respect to pages of content is estimated to be 0.3 for Asahi and for the full 
sample.  In short, the results of this nonlinear estimation are mixed, but not entirely 
discouraging.  The specification in equations [19] and [21], while not rendering precise 
estimates of the elasticity parameters, does seem to be a reasonable framework for further 
approximation of the effects of second-degree price discrimination by Japanese newspapers.  
And I will proceed on that presumption. But before getting to that, I will first describe 
estimates of the elasticity parameters using a different method.   
An alternative to the nonlinear estimation (as in Table 2), is to construct estimates of 
the demand for each newspaper from estimates of an indirect utility function using microdata. 
This I have done in another paper Flath (2012) that mainly focuses on the effects of 
coordinated pricing by the leading Japanese newspapers. Some details of the econometric 
specification are described in the Appendix here, and estimates of the indirect utility function 
as reported in the other paper are reprinted here as appendix Table A.1. The estimated 
elasticity parameters based on simulations using that indirect utility function estimate are 
shown in Table 4. These represent the arc elasticities of demand for the morning edition with 
respect to increases in the number of pages of morning content �𝜕 ln 𝑠𝑚
𝜕 ln𝑘𝑚
= 𝜃�, and with 
respect to an increase in the monthly morning subscription price �𝜕 ln 𝑠𝑚
𝜕 ln𝑝𝑚
= 𝜉𝑠� . The 
simulations for computing these arc elasticities entail five percent increases in pages of 
morning content or in price of the morning edition, for each newspaper individually.  It 
seems from the results reported in Table 4 that the elasticity of demand for morning edition 
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with respect to pages of morning content is about 0.4 and the elasticity with respect to 
morning subscription price averages about 1.3 and is a bit higher for the national newspapers 
than for the local ones.  This is not terribly different from the results using nonlinear 
estimation.  The next task is to estimate the distorting effects of the incentive compatibility 
constraint using the above framework. 
  
3. Towards an expanded model of pricing and content 
     Extending the basic framework to accommodate pricing and content choices by 
newspaper publishers offering morning and evening editions requires some additional 
assumptions.  First consider the demand for advertising.  The incremental cost of supplying 
ads per subscriber is inversely related to number of subscribers.  The evening subscribers 
are a subset of the morning subscribers. Why then would the newspaper even want to offer 
advertising in the evening edition? Or to put it a different way, if as seems likely given the 
higher incremental cost, the ad price per subscriber is greater for ads in the evening edition 
than in the morning edition, then what advertiser would place an ad in the evening edition? 
Perhaps advertisers who wish to specifically target evening subscribers would do so. The 
evening subscribers have a greater demand for newspaper content and so plausibly are more 
educated and have higher incomes, which might make them valuable targets for some 
advertisers. In the logic of the very general framework developed by Veiga and Weyl (2012), 
enabling targeted advertising could be a sufficient motivation for offering an evening edition 
in the first place, not mutually exclusive from the motivation of profiting from nonlinear 
pricing of subscriptions.   
Let us assume then that the demand for ads in the morning edition is independent of 
the demand for ads in the evening edition. Now, given the number of pages of content in both 
morning and evening editions km and ke, and assuming the demands for ads in the two 
editions are independent of one another, the profit-maximizing pricing rules are 
edition-specific variants of the rules derived in the basic framework1:  
                                                          
1 Perhaps the notation here is obvious enough from analogy with the single-edition case shown by equations 
[3]-[10].  So for example, the profit function for the dual-edition newspaper becomes 
𝜋   =  𝑝𝑠𝑚𝑠𝑘 − (𝑐̅(𝑎𝑘 + 𝑘𝑘) + 𝑐0𝑘)𝑠𝑘 + (𝑝𝑎𝑘 − 𝑓𝑎𝑘)𝑎𝑘 − 𝑓𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘                                                              +𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑒 − (𝑐̅(𝑎𝑒 + 𝑘𝑒) + 𝑐0𝑒)𝑠𝑒 + (𝑝𝑎𝑒 − 𝑓𝑎𝑒)𝑎𝑒 − 𝑓𝑘𝑒𝑘𝑒 , 
and the incremental cost of morning content is 
 𝑐𝑘𝑘 = 𝜕𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝜕𝑘𝑚 = 𝑓𝑘𝑘 + 𝑐̅𝑠𝑘 
and so on. 
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[23]  𝑝𝑎𝑚−𝑐𝑎𝑚
𝑝𝑎𝑚
= 1
𝜉𝑎𝑚
  
 
[24]  𝑝𝑠𝑚−𝑐𝑠𝑚
𝑝𝑠𝑚
= 1
𝜉𝑠
−
𝑝𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑚
𝑝𝑠𝑚𝑠𝑚
  
 
[25]  𝑝𝑎𝑒−𝑐𝑎𝑒
𝑝𝑎𝑒
= 1
𝜉𝑎𝑒
  
 
[26]  𝑝𝑠𝑒−𝑐𝑠𝑒
𝑝𝑠𝑒
= 1
𝜉𝑠
−
𝑝𝑎𝑒𝑎𝑒
𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑒
  
 
Notice that in the framework here, the demands for subscriptions are independent with 
respect to changes in prices.  This is because the marginal subscriber to the evening edition 
attains positive consumer surplus from the morning edition.  Thus a slightly higher or lower 
price for the morning edition pm only affects demand by morning-only subscribers, not 
morning-and-evening subscribers.  And a slightly higher or lower price of the evening 
edition has no effect on demand for the morning edition. The rules for profit-maximizing 
content are a bit different, reflecting the interdependence in demand for subscriptions with 
respect to choice of content.  The interdependence is a manifestation of the incentive 
-compatibility constraint.  The newspaper publisher adjusts pages of content mindful that 
the marginal morning-and-evening subscriber attains zero consumer surplus from the evening 
edition but positive consumer surplus from the morning edition.   
     The profit-maximizing content rules are: 
[27]  𝑐𝑘𝑚𝑘𝑚
𝑝𝑠𝑚𝑠𝑚
= 𝜃
𝜉𝑚
∗ + 1𝜉𝑒∗ � 𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑚𝑠𝑚� � 𝜕 ln𝑠𝑒𝜕 ln𝑘𝑚�  
where  
[28]  𝜕 ln𝑠𝑒
𝜕 ln𝑘𝑚
=  −𝜃�� 𝑘𝑚𝑘𝑚+𝑘𝑒�−� 𝑘𝑚𝑘𝑚+𝑘𝑒�𝜃𝜉𝑠
1−�
𝑘𝑚
𝑘𝑚+𝑘𝑒
�
𝜃
𝜉𝑠
� < 0  ,  
and 
[29]  𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑘𝑒
𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑒
= �𝜕 ln 𝑠𝑒𝜕 ln𝑘𝑒�
𝜉𝑒
∗   
where 
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[31]  𝜕 ln 𝑠𝑒
𝜕 ln𝑘𝑒
=  𝜃 � � 𝑘𝑒𝑘𝑚+𝑘𝑒�
1−�
𝑘𝑚
𝑘𝑚+𝑘𝑒
�
𝜃
𝜉𝑠
� > 𝜃,  
and where 
[32]  1
𝜉𝑚
∗ = 𝑝𝑠𝑚−𝑐𝑠𝑚+𝑝𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑚𝑠𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑚  , 
and 
[33]  1
𝜉𝑒
∗ = 𝑝𝑠𝑒−𝑐𝑠𝑒+𝑝𝑎𝑒𝑎𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑒 . 
 
The stipulations [32] and [33] are to allow for the possibility of collusive setting of 
subscription prices.  Many of the leading newspapers of Japan set the same subscription 
prices as one another which are higher than the prices set by other newspapers.  Thus it may 
well be, as argued in Flath (2012), that the newspapers are collusively raising their prices so 
that 𝜉𝑘
∗ < 𝜉𝑠 and 𝜉𝑒∗ < 𝜉𝑠. But the equation [27] would in that case still characterize the 
profit-maximizing choice of morning content pages 𝑘𝑘. 
The second term on the right-hand side of equation [27], which as shown by equation 
[28] is negative, reflects the incentive-compatibility constraint. The upshot is that the 
newspaper publisher reduces the content of the morning edition compared to what it would 
choose if not offering a morning and evening edition.  By how much? Setting parameters 
θ=0.4 and ξs=1.3, and based on the values for �
𝑘𝑒
𝑘𝑚+𝑘𝑒
� and � 𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑒
𝑝𝑠𝑚𝑠𝑚
� implied in Table 1 for 
the sample newspapers, 𝜕 𝑙𝑛 𝑠𝑒
𝜕 𝑙𝑛 𝑘𝑚
=—0.08. Setting θ and ξs at the levels indicated by the micro 
data estimates increases this slightly (to —0.09 on average) as shown in the last column of 
Table 3. It seems from this that the incentive compatibility constraint causes a reduction in 
𝑐𝑘𝑚𝑘𝑚
𝑝𝑠𝑚𝑠𝑚
 of about 6% = −� 𝜕 ln 𝑠𝑒
𝜕 ln𝑘𝑚
� �
1
𝜉𝑚
∗� = 0.08 ÷ 1.3.  If the daily content in the morning 
edition is km=20 pages, which is about average for the sample newspapers, then we could say 
that the incentive-compatibility constraint leads to withholding of around one page daily from 
the morning edition.  That is, the newspaper shorts the content of the morning edition by 
about one page each day, only to preserve demand for the evening edition.  To determine the 
monetary value of the economic waste from this shorting of the morning edition content 
requires an estimate of the actual demand for newspapers as in the Flath (2012) estimate of 
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indirect utility function using micro data, described in the Appendix, and which I will again 
exploit. 
Appendix Table A.1 reports the utility function parameter estimates from Flath (2012). 
Dividing the other coefficients by the estimated marginal disutility of subscription price 
converts them to monetary units (yen per month). Using this procedure, I am able to construct 
the marginal value of pages of content per month for each individual respondent. Summing 
the marginal values of the respondents that subscribe to each edition of each newspaper gives 
the marginal value of content pages in those newspapers. This is a similar exercise to the 
McManus (2007) estimate of the marginal value of coffee drinks.  But his estimate relied on 
aggregate data, where mine is based on micro-data.  My estimation procedure is less 
technically demanding which is not necessarily a bad thing. The marginal values of content 
for each newspaper are in Table 4. 
 The marginal value of content pages is slightly less for morning-only subscribers 
than for morning-and-evening subscribers of the same newspaper, averaging 1.13 yen per 
page per month per morning-only subscriber compared to 0.91 yen per page per month per 
morning-and-evening subscriber.  The net social benefit per morning-only subscriber from 
increasing the content of the morning edition by one page per month while decreasing the 
content of the evening edition by one page (that is switching the content page from the 
evening edition to the morning edition) equals the marginal value to the representative 
morning-only subscriber minus the cost per morning-only subscriber of printing the page.  
In Flath (2012) I estimate that cost to be 0.96 yen per page, which means that the net social 
benefit per morning-only subscriber of switching a content page from the evening edition to 
the morning edition is 1.13-0.96=0.17 yen.  To do this daily would have a social benefit of 
approximately 30×0.17=6.1 yen per month. This is small compared to the subscription 
prices that average around 3,000 yen per month for morning-only subscription. 
  
 
6.  Conclusion 
     Many of the large circulation Japanese newspapers offer demanders a choice between 
subscribing to the morning edition only, or to both the morning edition and evening edition.  
The price per page of content differs between these, which is an example of second-degree 
price discrimination based on self-selection by demanders.  The subscription price schedule 
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amounts to a nonlinear tariff, gauged to maximize newspaper profit.  The possibility of 
engaging in such profitable price discrimination is one reason even to offer an evening 
edition in the first place, which seems not to have been previously remarked.  The 
possibility of targeting advertising on higher income subscribers who are more likely to 
subscribe to an evening edition along with the morning edition is another reason to offer an 
evening edition.  Subscriber preference for more frequent news is yet another reason. As 
newspapers move to digital rather than print format, some analogue of the “evening edition” 
is likely to be profitable for all of the reasons that apply to the print version.  
   Here I have argued that not only the subscription prices but also the number of pages of 
content in each edition are gauged to maximize newspaper profit subject to the constraint that 
subscribers rationally maximize utility. I impute that if the typical large circulation Japanese 
newspaper added a page or two to the twenty pages of content in each day’s morning edition 
it would provoke some cancellations of evening subscriptions. Except for that, switching a 
page from the evening edition to the morning edition each day would be profitable.  
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Appendix. Estimates of the Demand for Newspapers Using Micro-Data 
 In Flath (2012) I estimate an indirect utility function for Japanese newspaper 
subscriptions based on March 2007 survey data, and use the estimates to simulate the effect 
of a deviation from coordinated pricing by the leading newspapers. Here I will briefly 
describe the indirect utility estimate and note the parts of the estimate that are relevant to the 
second-degree price discrimination that is the main focus of the present essay.  
 The micro-data come from a March 2007 random-direct-dial telephone survey of 
27,788 persons living throughout Japan conducted by Video Research, Ltd. (the 2007 edition 
of its annual JREAD survey).  I use these data to estimate the common parameters of a 
mixed-logit indirect utility function relating respondents’ choices among available daily 
newspaper subscriptions (including the choice of not subscribing to any newspaper), to their 
own individual characteristics such as age, income and education and to attributes of the 
newspapers available in the prefecture where each resides.  Attributes of the newspapers 
include subscription price, number of pages of content per month, and whether the 
subscription is morning-and-evening or morning-only.  Although the national newspapers 
are priced the same everywhere in Japan, they compete with different local and regional 
newspapers in each prefecture.  The variation in choice sets across prefectures is sufficient 
to identify the effects of subscription price and other newspaper attributes on respondents’ 
choices.  
The basic econometric model is a multinomial logit model of utility with random 
coefficient on one variable, price of subscription.  The utility of newspaper subscription 
choice j by individual i is a linear function of (1) attributes of the choice, (2) interactions 
between choice-invariant characteristics of the individual and attributes of the choice, and (3) 
an unobservable error 𝜀𝑖𝑗 that varies randomly across individuals and alternatives according 
to the Gumbel distribution (Type I Extreme Value distribution).  The utility function 
coefficient on price of subscription 𝑝𝑗 varies randomly across individuals according to the 
Normal distribution. 
 
[23] 𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽′𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼𝑖𝑝𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗      
𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝜎𝜐𝑖, where 𝜐𝑖 ~ 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙  [0, 1] 
𝜀𝑖𝑗 ~  𝐺𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑙  
 
The individual i chooses from among his choice set Ci the one alternative with the greatest 
utility value. The choice set includes any newspapers available for subscription in the place 
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where the person lives and the choice of subscribing to no newspaper at all (j=0).  Because 
𝑥𝑖0 = 0 and 𝑝0 = 0, the mean utility value of not subscribing to any newspaper is zero: 
Ui0=0. 
From the observed choice set of each individual, observed attributes of each 
alternative, observed characteristics of each individual, and observed choice of each 
individual, I estimate the parameters of the utility function that are common to all individuals (𝛽, 𝛼, 𝜎) using the method of simulated maximum likelihood (computed with the software 
NLOGIT).  
 The variables that enter the utility function are made up as follows. 
Attributes of the newspaper subscription choices that do not vary across individuals: 
—Subscription price (units=yen per month) pj  
—Natural logarithm of number of pages of content per month (“news hole”)  
 
Interactions between choice-invariant characteristics of the individual and attributes of the 
choice (with units of measurement equal to underlined expressions where present, otherwise 
equal to zero or one): 
—Age head of household (one of four discrete intervals)  × 
1. Natural log of pages of content per month 
2. National newspaper × morning-and-evening subscription 
 3. Local or Bloc newspaper × morning-and-evening subscription 
 
—Household annual income (one of sixteen discrete intervals ranging from zero to 
30-million yen or more per year) if greater than zero × 
1. Natural log of pages of content per month 
2. National newspaper × morning-and-evening subscription 
 3. Local or Bloc newspaper × morning-and-evening subscription 
 
—Each national newspaper (Yomiuri, Asahi, Mainichi, Sankei) × 
1. Survey response: “Participates in local festivals and holiday events.” 
   2. Head of household highest education level is college or above 
 
—For each national and bloc paper, square of road distance (th. Km) from newspaper home 
base to each individual’s prefecture of residence (home base for national papers Yomiuri, 
Asahi and Mainichi: Tokyo, for Sankei: Osaka; and for bloc papers Chunichi: Aichi, 
Chugoku: Hiroshima, and Nishi Nippon: Fukuoka). 
 
Appendix Table A.1 reports the utility function parameter estimates. Dividing the other 
coefficients by the estimated marginal disutility of subscription price converts them to 
monetary units (yen per month). 
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Table A1. Random-parameter logit estimate of indirect utility function 
 
Variable Parameter s.e. z 
Subscription price (yen per mo.) pj Mean of random coefficient   𝜶 -0.00073  0.00003  -23.8  
  s.d. in subscription price random 
coefficient                  𝝈 
 
0.00031  
 
0.00005  
 
7.0  
     
𝜷:  
   
ln pages of content per month  lnkj  -0.143  0.057  -2.5  
lnkj  × Household annual income =    
  less than 1 million yen -0.055  0.020  -2.8  
  1million yen up to 2 million yen -0.097  0.016  -5.9  
  2 million yen up to 3 million yen -0.050  0.015  -3.4  
  3 million yen up to 4 million yen -0.005  0.014  -0.4  
  4 million yen up to 5 million yen 0.028  0.014  1.9  
  5 million yen up to 6 million yen 0.039  0.015  2.6  
  6 million yen up to 7 million yen 0.075  0.016  4.7  
  7 million yen up to 8 million yen 0.096  0.017  5.5  
  8 million yen up to 9 million yen 0.080  0.019  4.2  
  9 million yen up to 10 million yen 0.084  0.019  4.3  
  10 million yen up to 12 million yen 0.129  0.021  6.1  
  12 million yen up to 15 million yen 0.153  0.027  5.7  
  15 million yen up to 20 million yen 0.135  0.031  4.3  
  20 million yen up to 30 million yen 0.113  0.053  2.1  
  30 million yen or more 0.191  0.087  2.2  
      
lnkj  × Age, head of household =    
  up to 24 yrs. 0.271  0.050  5.4  
  25 yrs to 44 yrs  0.400  0.056  7.2  
  45 yrs to 64 yrs 0.603  0.057  10.5  
  65 yrs or more 0.755  0.059  12.7  
      
Morning-and-Evening subscription 
to National newspaper 
 
× 
 
Household annual income = 
   
  less than 1 million yen 0.176  0.133  1.3  
  1million yen up to 2 million yen 0.233  0.105  2.2  
  2 million yen up to 3 million yen 0.309  0.073  4.2  
  3 million yen up to 4 million yen 0.394  0.063  6.3  
  4 million yen up to 5 million yen 0.287  0.062  4.6  
  5 million yen up to 6 million yen 0.290  0.063  4.6  
  6 million yen up to 7 million yen 0.359  0.063  5.7  
  7 million yen up to 8 million yen 0.516  0.067  7.8  
  8 million yen up to 9 million yen 0.495  0.077  6.5  
  9 million yen up to 10 million yen 0.625  0.073  8.6  
  10 million yen up to 12 million yen 0.656  0.069  9.5  
  12 million yen up to 15 million yen 0.771  0.080  9.7  
  15 million yen up to 20 million yen 0.844  0.102  8.3  
  20 million yen up to 30 million yen 0.969  0.176  5.5  
  30 million yen or more 1.089  0.217  5.0  
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Variable Parameter s.e. z 
  
 
 
 
 
    
Morning-and-Evening subscription 
to Local or Bloc newspaper 
 
× 
 
Household annual income = 
   
  less than 1 million yen -0.187  0.192  -1.0  
  1million yen up to 2 million yen 0.487  0.116  4.2  
  2 million yen up to 3 million yen 0.553  0.079  7.0  
  3 million yen up to 4 million yen 0.438  0.071  6.2  
  4 million yen up to 5 million yen 0.365  0.075  4.9  
  5 million yen up to 6 million yen 0.465  0.076  6.1  
  6 million yen up to 7 million yen 0.447  0.079  5.6  
  7 million yen up to 8 million yen 0.452  0.089  5.1  
  8 million yen up to 9 million yen 0.699  0.102  6.9  
  9 million yen up to 10 million yen 0.659  0.103  6.4  
  10 million yen up to 12 million yen 0.495  0.101  4.9  
  12 million yen up to 15 million yen 0.651  0.130  5.0  
  15 million yen up to 20 million yen 0.727  0.171  4.3  
  20 million yen up to 30 million yen 0.754  0.305  2.5  
  30 million yen or more 1.267  0.300  4.2  
      
Participates in local festivals and 
holiday events 
 
× 
 
Asahi 
 
-0.647  
 
0.030  
 
-21.4  
  Mainichi -1.266  0.040  -31.9  
  Yomiuri -0.339  0.029  -11.9  
  Sankei -1.808  0.066  -27.4  
      
Head of household highest 
education level is college or above 
 
× 
 
Asahi 
 
0.272  
 
0.036  
 
7.6  
  Mainichi -0.471  0.048  -9.9  
  Yomiuri -0.152  0.039  -3.9  
  Sankei -1.028  0.079  -13.0  
      
Asahi, Mainichi, Yomiuri × Th. Km from Tokyo, squared -0.010  0.000  -41.3  
Sankei × Th. Km from Osaka, squared -0.056  0.002  -26.8  
Chunichi × Th. Km from Aichi, squared -0.211  0.021  -10.1  
Chugoku × Th. Km from Hiroshima, squared -0.932  0.064  -14.6  
Nishi Nippon × Th. Km from Fukuoka, squared -0.664  0.043  -15.5  
 
 
n=27,778 
Chi squared [65 d.f.]= 132,971 
Log likelihood function= -51,966 
Restricted log likelihood= -118,451 
Inf.Cr.AIC=104062 AIC/N = 3.745 
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Table 1.  Morning and evening monthly subscription prices, circulation, pages of content 
and pages of ads; selected Japanese daily newspapers, 2007 
 
 
  subscription 
price yen 
per month 
circulation 
pages of  pages of  
content per 
month 
ads per 
month 
Newspaper pe pm sm se km ke am ae 
         
THE ASAHI SHIMBUN 
(Hokkaido)  918 3,007 155,750 53,740 621 159 466 82 
THE ASAHI SHIMBUN 
(Nagoya)  918 3,007 424,246 146,107 598 189 451 70 
THE ASAHI SHIMBUN (Osaka)   918 3,007 2,336,911 1,294,724 599 188 544 163 
THE ASAHI SHIMBUN (Tokyo)  918 3,007 4,358,660 1,958,061 606 223 618 190 
THE ASAHI SHIMBUN (Seibu)  918 3,007 791,140 135,628 605 181 507 88 
MAINICHI SHIMBUN 
(Hokkaido)  918 3,007 72,617 17,697 524 174 267 38 
MAINICHI SHIMBUN (Nagoya)  918 3,007 176,101 49,069 546 169 267 47 
MAINICHI SHIMBUN (Osaka)  918 3,007 1,419,552 830,585 547 180 377 113 
MAINICHI SHIMBUN (Tokyo)  918 3,007 1,640,998 462,952 575 204 379 81 
MAINICHI SHIMBUN (Seibu)  918 3,007 664,559 102,896 498 151 346 63 
YOMIURI SHIMBUN 
(Hokkaido)  918 3,007 232,992 64,396 614 233 522 101 
YOMIURI SHIMBUN (Osaka)  918 3,007 2,547,583 1,332,683 609 234 608 179 
YOMIURI SHIMBUN (Tokyo)  918 3,007 6,068,547 2,357,250 590 282 640 195 
YOMIURI SHIMBUN (Seibu)  918 3,007 914,687 109,479 578 191 521 78 
SANKEI SHIMBUN (Osaka)  975 2,950 1,224,957 633,154 581 227 320 124 
HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN    918 3,007 1,204,151 639,634 599 252 553 131 
THE KAHOKU SHIMPO  918 3,007 501,356 109,871 611 136 364 65 
THE TOKYO SHIMBUN  700 2,550 585,508 280,889 592 203 299 90 
THE CHUNICHI SHIMBUN  925 3,000 2,774,585 650,297 617 217 465 121 
KYOTO SHIMBUN  918 3,007 510,000 317,881 589 173 344 113 
KOBE SHIMBUN  918 3,007 561,881 254,782 587 185 314 121 
THE CHUGOKU SHIMBUN  918 3,007 717,794 73,628 629 162 416 46 
THE NISHI-NIPPON SHIMBUN  918 3,007 854,655 175,518 600 183 476 131 
 
Sources:  
pages of ads, total pages: Dentsu Inc.  Dentsuu koukoku nenkan (Dentsu advertising annual).   
 
subscription prices, circulation:  Japan Audit Bureau of Circulation. shimbun hakkousha repooto (newspaper publisher 
report), 2007 (Jan to June average) and 2007 (July to December average).  
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Table 2.  Nonlinear least squares regression 
 
 
Estimating equation: 
𝑠𝑒
𝑠𝑘
= �𝑝𝑘
𝑝𝑒
�
𝜉𝑠
��
𝑘𝑘
𝑘𝑘 + 𝑘𝑒�−𝜃𝜉𝑠 − 1�
𝜉𝑠 +  ε 
 
 
 
 
 
 
parameter 
Estimates and Asymptotic Standard Errors 
Aggregate  
Data* 
Disaggregated Data (cities) 
Yomiuri Asahi 
Full 
Sample** 
     
 
 
  
 
𝜉𝑠 1.24  1.21  0.86  0.93  
s.e. 0.65  0.14  0.12  0.06  
 
 
  
 
𝜃 0.50  0.41  0.31  0.29  
 s.e. 0.49  0.09  0.09  0.04  
 
 
  
 
n 23 525 612 2377 
 
 
  
 
F 64.7  1333.8  2446.9  6981.6 
  
*Based on national circulation, from Table 1. 
 
**Yomiuri, Asahi, Mainichi, Sankei, Hokkaido Shimbun, Kyoto Shimbun, Kobe Shimbun, 
Chugoku Shimbun, Chunichi, Kahoku Shimpo, Nishi Nippon, Tokyo Shimbun 
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Table 3. Arc elasticities of demand for the morning edition with respect to pages of content 
per month 𝜃 and with respect to subscription price 𝜉s, based on indirect utility function, and 
value of 𝜕 ln 𝑠𝑒
𝜕 ln𝑘𝑒
 implied by these elasticities 
 
 
 
Newspaper 
𝜃 𝜉s 𝜕 ln 𝑠𝑒𝜕 ln 𝑘𝑒 =  𝜃
⎝
⎜
⎛ �
𝑘𝑒
𝑘𝑘 + 𝑘𝑒�1 − � 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝑘𝑒�𝜃𝜉𝑠⎠⎟
⎞ 
THE ASAHI SHIMBUN  0.42  1.45  -0.12 
MAINICHI SHIMBUN 0.44  1.60  -0.12 
YOMIURI SHIMBUN 0.42  1.49  -0.11 
SANKEI SHIMBUN 0.43  1.26  -0.12 
HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN   0.29  0.84  -0.07 
THE KAHOKU SHIMPO 0.41  1.06  -0.04 
THE TOKYO SHIMBUN 0.39  1.15  -0.09 
THE CHUNICHI SHIMBUN 0.40  1.51  -0.07 
KYOTO SHIMBUN 0.37  1.33  -0.16 
KOBE SHIMBUN 0.46  1.29  -0.10 
THE CHUGOKU SHIMBUN 0.32  1.20  -0.02 
THE NISHINIPPON SHIMBUN 0.36  1.27  -0.05 
   
 
MEAN 0.39  1.29  -0.09 
S.D. 0.05  0.21  0.04 
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Table 4. Marginal value of a page of content, averaged across morning-only subscribers and 
morning-and-evening subscribers, based on indirect utility function estimate 
 
  
pages of 
content per month 
Marginal Value, averaged 
over subscribers 
(units=yen per page of 
content) 
 
Newspaper km ke km+ke MV(km) MV(km+ke) 𝜟 
THE ASAHI SHIMBUN (Hokkaido)  621 159 780 0.81  0.94  0.13  
THE ASAHI SHIMBUN (Nagoya)  598 189 787 1.10  0.93  -0.17  
THE ASAHI SHIMBUN (Osaka)   599 188 788 1.08  0.88  -0.21  
THE ASAHI SHIMBUN (Tokyo)  606 223 829 1.09  0.87  -0.21  
THE ASAHI SHIMBUN (Seibu)  605 181 785 1.07  0.95  -0.12  
MAINICHI SHIMBUN (Hokkaido)  524 174 698 1.25  0.95  -0.30  
MAINICHI SHIMBUN (Nagoya)  546 169 715 1.42  1.14  -0.28  
MAINICHI SHIMBUN (Osaka)  547 180 727 1.33  0.94  -0.39  
MAINICHI SHIMBUN (Tokyo)  575 204 779 1.33  0.90  -0.43  
MAINICHI SHIMBUN (Seibu)  498 151 649 1.49  1.08  -0.42  
YOMIURI SHIMBUN (Hokkaido)  614 233 847 1.00  0.83  -0.17  
YOMIURI SHIMBUN (Osaka)  609 234 842 0.99  0.76  -0.24  
YOMIURI SHIMBUN (Tokyo)  590 282 871 1.11  0.82  -0.29  
YOMIURI SHIMBUN (Seibu)  578 191 808 1.16  0.84  -0.32  
SANKEI SHIMBUN (Osaka)  581 227 851 0.97  0.78  -0.19  
HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN    599 252 747 1.08  0.94  -0.14  
THE KAHOKU SHIMPO  611 136 795 1.14  0.91  -0.23  
THE TOKYO SHIMBUN  592 203 834 1.06  0.88  -0.19  
THE CHUNICHI SHIMBUN  617 217 762 1.06  0.90  -0.16  
KYOTO SHIMBUN  589 173 772 1.11  0.91  -0.21  
KOBE SHIMBUN  587 185 791 1.05  0.93  -0.12  
THE CHUGOKU SHIMBUN  629 162 783 1.13  0.97  -0.15  
THE NISHI-NIPPON SHIMBUN  600 183 780 0.81  0.94  0.13  
       
MEAN 588 196 784 1.13  0.91  -0.22  
S.D. 33 35 54 0.15  0.09  0.12  
 
 
